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Abstract
This paper presents a dynamic model to study the impact on the
economic outcomes in different societies during the Malthusian Era
of individualism (time spent working alone) and collectivism (com-
plementary time spent working with others). The model is driven
by opposing forces: a greater degree of collectivism provides a higher
safety net for low quality workers but a greater degree of individualism
allows high quality workers to leave larger bequests. The model sug-
gests that more individualistic societies display smaller populations,
greater per capita income and greater income inequality. Some (lim-
ited) historical evidence is consistent with these predictions.
It is widely agreed (see Landes (1998) for instance) that culture has an
important influence on social outcomes and economic outcomes but there is
little agreement on which aspects of culture are important for which eco-
nomic outcomes, whether these aspects are different in different eras, and
through what mechanisms culture operates. This paper focuses on the im-
pact of one aspect of culture – the degree of individualism vs. collectivism –
on the population, income and income distribution of societies in the period
between the Neolithic Revolution and the Industrial Revolution – a period in
which life was (in the words of Thomas Hobbes) “nasty, brutish and short,”
in which agriculture was the mainstay of economic activity and societies were
stuck in the Malthusian trap, which Clark (2008), Clark (2007), Ashraf and
Galor (2011) and Galor (2005) (and others) characterize by subsistence with
no technological progress and little or no growth in either population or in-
come. We provide and analyze a model of the mechanism through which
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individualism and collectivism act. Our model predicts that societies that
are more individualistic (less collectivistic) tend to have smaller populations,
higher mean incomes, and greater income inequality. Perhaps surprisingly,
our model predicts that technological differences may matter a great deal
for the size of the population but not for income or income inequality. We
offer some historical evidence that is consistent with the predictions of the
model.(Clark (2008), Clark (2007), Ashraf and Galor (2011) and Galor (2005)
have offered mathematical models of the Malthusian trap, but these models
do not offer an explanation of how or why cross-cultural differences – in par-
ticular, differences in the degree of individualism and collectivism – might
have influenced outcomes in this period. This is precisely the explanation
our mathematical model is designed to provide. Gorodnichenko and Roland
(2011b), Gorodnichenko and Roland (2011a), Roland and Gorodnichenko
(2010) offer an analysis of the impact of indivualism vs. collectivism in
the era after the Industrial Revolution. They argue that individualism re-
wards status and hence promotes innovation which in turn promotes growth.
However it does not seem that this explanation can explain the impact of
individualism vs. collectivism in the Malthusian Era – in which there was no
growth.)
We follow Hofstede (1984) in viewing individualism as an aspect of cul-
ture that is associated with traits like acting independently and taking care
of oneself and collectivism as an aspect that is associated with mutual depen-
dence amongst the members of the group. As in Hofstede (1984), we view
individualism and collectivism as aspects of the culture of a society, which
might or might not arise as aspects of the political structure. We formalize
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the degree of individualism as the fraction of time that members of society
work by themselves and enjoy only the output of their own activity and the
degree of collectivism as the complementary fraction of time that members
of society work together and enjoy the output of the group activity. We
take these fractions as a universal social norm that is observed by all the
members of society and not as choices of different members of society (but
these fractions differ across societies). The societal division of time/labor
matters because individuals differ in ability (physical strength, skill, etc.).
When working individually, output per unit time depends on the individ-
ual’s ability; when working collectively, output per unit time depends on the
average ability of society. When working collectively the less able members
of society produce more per unit time than when working alone – so a greater
degree of collectivism provides a social “safety net” for the low ability mem-
bers of society. On the other hand, when working collectively the more able
members of society produce less per unit time than when working alone –
so a greater degree of collectivism decreases the wealth of the high ability
members of society and hence the bequests they leave (to new-borns) when
they die. Because income from production and inheritance from bequests
both affect the path of individual wealth and hence lifespan, the degree of
collectivism and the complementary degree of individualism create opposing
forces ; the balance of these forces (and others) plays out in a complicated
and subtle way.
4
1 Model
The features of the model that we develop here are intended to represent
(some aspects of) steady-state outcomes of societies in the Malthusian Era,
in which (changing) technology does not play an important role.
Before giving a formal mathematical description of the model, we begin
with an informal verbal description that expands on what we have already
said in the Introduction. We consider a world populated by a continuum
of individuals of two types either Low quality or High quality.1 Time is
continuous and the horizon is infinite. The lifecycle of an individual is:
• individuals are born and come into an inheritance;
• during their lifetimes, individuals consume and produce;
• individuals die and leave a bequest for succeeding individuals.
While they are alive and producing, each individual spends a fraction of its
time working alone and consuming the output of its individual production,
and the complementary fraction of its time working with others and sharing
(equally) in the joint production. We interpret these fractions as (proxies for)
the degree of individualism and the degree of collectivism of the society.2 We
1Allowing for more quality levels would complicate the analysis without altering the
qualitative conclusions.
2For example, Leibbrandt, Gneezy and List (2013) show that lake based fishing areas
are more individualistic and involve more isolated work by the individuals, while sea based
fishing areas are more collectivistic and involve more collective work by the individuals.
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view these fractions as social norms which are the same across all individuals
in the society, rather than as individual choices. (We are agnostic about
the origins of these social norms; one possibility is that they are imposed
by a governmental structure but there are many other possibilities.) When
individuals work alone, their output depends on their own quality; when
individuals work with others, their output depends on the average quality of
society. In both modes, output is subject to congestion: productivity is less
when the total population is greater. (This congestion is an essential part of
Clark’s argument for why societies remain in the Malthusian trap and plays
an important role in our model as well.) During their lifetimes, individuals
consume at a constant rate. (We discuss alternative assumptions below)
Some individuals produce less than they consume and eventually consume
their entire inheritance; at that point their wealth is zero and they die in
poverty. Individuals who do not die in poverty eventually die of natural
causes. Individuals who die with positive wealth leave that wealth as a
bequest to the new-born.
We now turn to the formal mathematical description. We consider a
continuous-time model with a continuum of individuals. Some individuals
are of High quality and some are of Low quality; it is convenient to index
quality by Q = 0, 1 (Low, High).3 The state of society at each moment
of time is described by the population distributions P0,P1; PQ(x, t) is the
population of individuals of quality Q who have wealth less than or equal to
3The individuals in our model are productive adults, so we view their quality as fixed
and not changing over their lifetimes.
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x at time t. The population of individuals of quality Q at time t is
PQ(t) = lim
x→∞
PQ(x, t)
Thus the total population at time t is
P (t) = P0(t) + P1(t)
and the average quality at time t is
Q¯(t) = [0 · P0(t) + 1 · P1(t)]/P (t) = P1(t)/P (t)
Individuals are born at the constant rate λf and die natural deaths at the
constant rate λd.
4 Half of all newborns are of High quality and half are of
Low quality. (The assumption that the proportions of new-borns of High and
Low quality are constant is made only for simplicity: none of the qualitative
results would change if we assumed that quality is partly inheritable, so that
the proportions of High and Low quality newborns depend on the current
population. The assumption of equal proportions is made only to simplify
the algebra.) As we discuss below, some individuals also die in poverty.
While they are alive, individuals produce and consume. We assume that
each individual spends a fraction z of its time working alone and the remain-
ing fraction 1 − z working with others. As noted, we identify z with the
degree of individualism of the society and 1− z as the degree of collectivism.
4 Clark (2008) argues that the fertility rate is an increasing function of the wealth of
society and that the death rate is a decreasing function of the wealth of society. Those fea-
tures could be incorporated into our model without changing the qualitative conclusions,
although at the expense of substantial mathematical complication.
7
When an individual works alone its production depends on its own quality
and is consumed entirely by the individual; when it works with others its
production depends on the average quality of society (at the given moment
of time) and is shared; in both modes, productivity is subject to conges-
tion and so diminishes with increasing population. For simplicity, we assume
productivity is linear in quality so productivity of an individual of quality
Q = 0, 1 at a given time t when population is P (t) and average quality is Q¯(t)
is [Q − cP (t)] when working alone and [γQ¯(t) − cP (t)] when working with
others, where γ is a parameter that represents the efficiency of group pro-
duction. (Our assumptions about functional forms are made for tractability;
our assumption that low quality individuals working alone produce nothing
is simply a normalization. As we will see below, the essential point is that,
when working alone, low quality individuals produce less than they consume
so that their wealth decreases. (The role of the parameter γ will be discussed
in greater detail below.) Hence the overall productivity of an individual of
quality Q = 0, 1 is
FQ(t) = z[Q− cP (t)] + (1− z)[γQ¯(t)− cP (t)]
= zQ+ (1− z)γQ¯(t)− cP (t)
(1)
We emphasize that Q is the innate and fixed quality of the (adult) individual
and that z, 1−z are characteristics of the society, and not individual choices.
We assume each individual consumes at the constant (subsistence) rate
k; for algebraic simplicity (only) we take k = 1/2. Hence the rate of pro-
duction net of consumption for an individual with quality Q is FQ(t)− 1/2.
Individuals who die at time t leave a fraction η < 1 of their wealth as an
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inheritance for individuals born at the same time t; the remaining fraction
1− η of this wealth is lost in storage. We write y(t0) as the (common) inher-
itance of individuals who are born at time t0. So an individual of quality Q
born at time t0 begins life with wealth Xq(t0) = y(t0); and its wealth changes
during its lifetime at the rate:
dXQ(t)/dt = FQ(t)− 1/2 (2)
We stress that an individual’s wealth may shrink or grow; if it shrinks, it may
eventually shrink to 0 before the individual dies of natural causes in which
case the individual dies in poverty. Of course individuals who die in poverty
do not leave an inheritance. In our analysis, we show that the system has a
unique non-degenerate steady state. In this steady state, dX0(t)/dt < 0 and
dX1(t)/dt > 0 so the wealth of low quality individuals shrinks and the wealth
of high quality individuals grows; it follows that some low quality individuals
die in poverty but no high quality individuals die in poverty.
We have defined the state of society at time t in terms of the population
distributions P0,P1; however in analyzing the evolution of society it is more
convenient to work with the population densities p0, p1. By definition,
PQ(x, t) =
∫ x
0
pQ(xˆ, t) dxˆ
Working with densities is more convenient because their evolution is deter-
mined by the following evolution equations, which are based on the principle
of mass conservation:
∂p0(x, t)
∂t
+
∂p0(x, t)
∂x
[F0(t)− 1/2] = −λdp0(x, t)
∂p1(x, t)
∂t
+
∂p1(x, t)
∂x
[F1(t)− 1/2] = −λdp1(x, t) (3)
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Figure 1: Individual’s life span
The first term on the left hand sides of these PDE (3) represents the rate
of change of the population density at a given wealth level and the second
term is the divergence of the flux; the right hand sides represents the rate
at which individuals die due to natural causes. Note that neither deaths in
poverty nor births appear in the evolution equations. This is because deaths
in poverty only occur at x = 0 and births only occur at x = y(t) (inheritance
at time t); deaths in poverty and births enter into the behavior of the system
as “boundary conditions” at 0, x = y(t) (see the Appendix). Note that these
evolution equations are coupled because productivity of agents of each quality
depends on the total population rather than on the population of the given
quality. Note too that the “boundary” x = y(t) is moving because inheritance
y(t) is a function of the population distributions and hence depends on time.
We summarize the life-span of an individual in Figure 1.
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1.1 Steady State
We are interested in societies in the steady state; because we are interested
in the (long) period after the Neolithic Revolution and before the Industrial
Revolution, during which there was little growth or change (see for instance
Clark (2008)), this seems reasonable. We define the steady state as the state
of the society in which the distribution of individuals (of each type) across
wealth levels is unchanging over time; i.e., ∂pQ(x, t)/∂t ≡ 0 for Q = 0, 1. In
the the steady state, the birth and (overall) death rate are constant and equal,
so the populations P0(t), P1(t), P (t) are constant; write P
s
0 , P
s
1 , P
s for the
steady state values. Because the population is constant, so are the average
quality Qs = P s1 /P
s, the productivities of individuals of each quality F sQ =
zQ + (1 − z)Qs − cP s, and inherited wealth Y s. (All these values will be
determined endogenously by the parameters of the model and the condition
that the society is in steady state.)
There is always a degenerate steady state in which population is iden-
tically 0. In order to guarantee that a non-degenerate steady state exists,
we need four assumptions, which will be maintained in what follows without
further comment.
Assumptions
1. λd < λf < 2λd
2. λd/λf < γ
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3. 0 < z < λd
λf
4. 1/(1 +
[1−λd/λf ]
ln( 1
2[1−λd/λf ]
)
) < η
Some comments on these assumptions are in order. If the natural birth rate
were less then the natural death rate then the population of society would
shrink to 0 in the long run so the only steady state would be degenerate.
Similar reasoning explains the second assumption. To see why the third
assumption is needed, suppose for a moment that z = 0, so that the society
were completely collectivist. In a completely collectivist society, individual
output depends only on average quality and not on individual quality, and
hence net output in a steady state would be Q¯s−cPs−1/2. If net output were
positive, inheritance would blow up; if net output were negative, inheritance
would shrink to 0. Hence in the steady state, net output must be 0. But this
means that no individuals die in poverty; since the average quality of newly
born agents is 1/2, the steady state average quality of the population must
also be 1/2 and the steady state population must be 0. Hence a completely
collectivist society cannot persist in a non-degenerate steady state. Similar
reasoning shows that an extremely individualistic society cannot persist in a
non-degenerate steady state; the necessity of the given upper bound is derived
in the proof of Theorem 1. (Put differently: our model cannot apply to a
society that is too collectivist or too individualistic.) The last assumption
asserts that the loss of wealth in inheritance is not too great. (Recall that
we have already assumed η < 1; i.e. some wealth is lost in inheritance.) If η
were below the given bound then, as the proof of Theorem 1 demonstrates,
the population of low quality individuals would go to 0, which would once
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Figure 2: Steady State Distribution of Wealth
again be inconsistent with a non-degenerate steady state.
Given these Assumptions, we can show that there is a unique non-degenerate
steady state.
Theorem 1 There is a unique non-degenerate steady state.
Figure 2 illustrates the steady state wealth distribution for typical values
of the parameters. Note that the population of High quality individuals is
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greater than that of Low quality individuals, as indeed it must be given our
assumptions.
We defer the proof of this result (and all others) to the Appendix.
2 Model Predictions
We now show that our model has strong – and perhaps surprising – implica-
tions for economic outcomes.
To understand what drives these implications, it is useful to think about
the various forces at work and how they manifest in the various aspects of the
steady state. Throughout the discussion, we take birth and death rates and
inheritability η of bequests as fixed, so that the steady state depends on the
congestion coefficient c, the group efficiency γ and the degree of individualism
z.
The forces that these parameters generate can be seen most easily by
comparing the non-degenerate steady state populations in different societies
which differ in only one of these parameters. With an obvious abuse of
language we may speak of one of these parameters being or becoming larger.
Intuitively at least we can reason as follows.
• If we hold group efficiency γ and degree of individualism z fixed then
a larger congestion parameter c generates a downward force on the
population. To see this, note that a larger c implies a more negative
14
congestion effect, so that productivity will be lower in both individ-
ual and group modes. Hence the wealth of low quality individuals
will decline more quickly and wealth of high quality individuals will
increase more slowly. From this it also follows that individuals who
die of natural causes will leave a smaller bequest, and hence that new-
born individuals will come into a smaller inheritance. In particular,
low quality individuals will begin with less wealth, spend that wealth
faster, and hence be more likely to die in poverty before they die of nat-
ural causes. So if the congestion parameter is larger then the steady
state population should be smaller.
• If we hold congestion c and degree of individualism z fixed then greater
group efficiency γ generates an upward force on the population. To
see this note that greater group efficiency means greater productivity
for both high and low quality individuals when working with others.
Hence the wealth of low quality individuals will decline more slowly and
the wealth of high quality individuals will increase more quickly. From
this, it also follows that individuals who die of natural causes will leave
a larger bequest, and hence that new-born individuals will come into
a larger inheritance. In particular, low quality individuals will begin
with greater wealth, spend that wealth more slowly, and hence be less
likely to die in poverty before they die of natural causes. So if group
efficiency is greater then the steady state population should be larger.
• However if we hold congestion c and group efficiency γ fixed then a
greater degree of individualism z generates both upward and downward
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forces on the population. To see this note that, on the one hand,
low quality individuals produce more per unit time when working with
others than when working alone, so working with others provides low
quality workers with a “safety net.” A greater degree of individualism
lowers this “safety net”, so that the wealth of low quality workers more
quickly and they die in poverty more often. On the other hand (at least
if γ is not too large) high quality individuals produce less per until time
when working with others than when working alone. A greater degree of
individualism therefore increases the rate at which high quality workers
accumulate wealth, and hence increases the bequests they leave when
they die, which in turn implies that low quality individuals begin life
with greater wealth and tend to die in poverty less often. Evidently,
these forces work in opposite directions so the impact of the degree of
individualism on population depends on the balance between them; we
show below, the net effect depends on the relative magnitude of all the
parameters.
As Theorem 2 below demonstrates formally, these intuitions about the impact
of parameters on steady state population are indeed correct (and we can say
even more about the impact of individualism). However, we warn the reader
that, as we will see later, similar intuitions about the impact of parameters
on other economic outcomes are not correct . Although it may seem quite
surprising, neither the congestion coefficient c nor the group efficiency γ
influences mean income or income inequality.
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Theorem 2 In the non-degenerate steady state, population depends on c, γ, z
in the following way:
(a) P s is decreasing as a function of the congestion parameter c;
(b) P s is increasing as a function of group efficiency γ
(c) for each c > 0 there is a threshold γ∗ such that
(i) if γ < γ∗ then P s is linearly increasing in z;
(ii) if γ > γ∗ then P s is linearly decreasing in z.
Theorem 2 describes the dependence of the total population on the various
parameters but is silent about the dependence of the populations of each
quality and the ratio of these populations. Perhaps surprisingly, as Theorem
3 below asserts formally this ratio is independent of all the parameters. To
understand the intuition for this conclusion, suppose the parameters change
in such a way that the population of low quality workers grows. Because
the birth rate and the ratio of low quality births to high quality births are
constant, the population of high quality workers must also grow – and, as
we show, it must grow at precisely the same rate as the population of low
quality workers, so that the ratio of the populations remains constant.
Theorem 3 In the non-degenerate steady state, the population ratio P s0 /P
s
1
is independent of c, γ, z.
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We now turn from population to income, in particular to mean income and
to income inequality. We identify income with output so the mean income
of society in the steady state is
F s = [F s0P
s
0 + F
s
1P
s
1 ]/P
s
Theorem 4 In the non-degenerate steady state, mean income is independent
of c, γ and linearly increasing in the degree of individualism z.
At first glance, Theorem 4 might seem startling. It is natural to think
of improved technology as manifested in a smaller congestion coefficient c
and a larger group efficiency γ; in view of Theorem 2 this would lead to
an increase in the size of the population. However as population increases,
so does congestion which reduces the (per capita) gains to the improved
technology; in the steady state, these forces exactly balance out. It seems
important to point out that this is not simply an artifact of our model; Ashraf
and Galor [3] argue that this is precisely what is observed in the data.
We measure income inequality in the familiar way as the Gini coefficient
of the income distribution. Because there are only two types of individuals,
the Gini coefficient takes the particularly simple form
F s1P
s
1 /F
sP s − P s1 /P s =
[
P s1
P s
] [
F s1
F s
− 1
]
Theorem 5 In the non-degenerate steady state the Gini coefficient is inde-
pendent of c, γ and increasing in the level of individualism z.
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3 Some Historical Evidence
As we have said before, we intend our model to be descriptive of societies in
the period between the Neolithic Revolution and the Industrial Revolution.
Although only a limited amount of data is available for this period and there
is some disagreement about its quality, it nevertheless seems appropriate to
compare the predictions of our model with the data that is available.
Our model makes use of a number of parameters: the birth and death
rates λf , λd, the fraction η of wealth that is inheritable, the coefficient c of
congestion, the group efficiency γ, and the degree z of individualism. Unfor-
tunately, none of these parameters can be observed directly. (At least, none
of these parameters were observed directly in the data that is available to
us.) What is available is an index of individualism calculated by Hofstede
(1984), which we use as a proxy for z (rescaled to lie in [0, 1]).5 In comparing
the predictions of our model with historical data we make the simple (but
perhaps heroic) assumption that birth and death rates and the fraction of
wealth that is inheritable are the same across societies. It seems completely
implausible to assume that technologies are the same across societies – and
hence that the technological parameters c, γ are the same across societies –
5A natural alternative would be to assume that z is a (monotone) Box-Cox transfor-
mation (Box and Cox, 1964) of Hofstede’s index. We have in fact computed the optimal
Box-Cox transformation and carried through the regressions after performing the optimal
Box-Cox transformation; however, there is almost no change in either the regression lines
or the fit to the data. The results of these regressions are available from the authors on
request.
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so we focus on the predictions for mean income and Gini coefficient, which
are independent of these parameters.
To examine the implications of Theorem 4 with historical data, we use
estimates of GDP in 1500 CE provided in Maddison (2008) for Western
Europe. We identify mean income with GDP per capita We use linear least-
squares regression to compute the best-fitting straight line; the data and
regression results can be seen in Figure 3. (Note that some of the “countries”
that appear in Figure 3 – e.g. Italy – did not exist in 1500. Maddison uses
the names to refer to the geographic areas occupied by the current countries.)
Unfortunately, we do not find any data for Gini coefficients from 1500
CE (the period of the data used above). We therefore use the estimates of
Gini coefficients given by Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson (2007). This
data from the (roughly) 100 year period 1788-1886 C.E. which might be
thought to be after the Industrial Revolution and hence not appropriate for
our model. However, for those countries in which the Industrial Revolution
arrived early (especially England, France and The Netherlands), the data
and the calculations/estimations are from the beginning of this period, which
would seem to be predominantly before the Industrial Revolution, while for
those countries (especially Brazil, China and Peru) for which the data and
the calculations/estimations are from the end of this period, the Industrial
Revolution did not in fact arrive until much later. The data and regression
results can be seen in Figure 4.
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4 Discussion and Conclusions
This paper proposes and analyzes a model that provides a mechanism by
which the tension between individualism and collectivism can lead to different
economic outcomes in different societies. The model captures important
features of the period between the Neolithic Revolution and the Industrial
Revolution era as discussed in the work of Clark (2008) and others. The
model makes predictions about the impact of individualism and collectivism
on different societies, and these predictions seem consistent with (limited)
historical data.
We reach no conclusion as to whether individualism or collectivism is
“better” – indeed, the predictions of the model show that such a conclusion
would depend entirely on the criteria used. In particular, our prediction is
that a greater degree of individualism leads to higher mean income (GDP per
capita) but also to greater inequality; the first seems desirable, the second
does not.
The model presented above makes many simplifying assumptions – but
the model could be generalized in many dimensions (allowing for non-linear
congestion and non-constant fertility and death rates, for instance) without
qualitative changes in the conclusions. Other generalizations might allow for
the possibility that individual output and deaths due to poverty are stochas-
tic (rather than deterministic) – but such generalizations would seem to lead
to enormous complications.
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We have confined our analysis to the steady state of the society which
seems reasonable given that we are interested in the Malthusian Era in which
there was little or no change. However even in the Malthusian era there were
shocks – famines and epidemics – which perturbed the system from its steady
state, so it would certainly be of interest to know if the steady state of our
model is at least locally stable – i.e. if the system converges to the steady
state from any initial point close to the steady state. Unfortunately, this is
an extremely complicated problem and well beyond or capabilities. Out of
the steady state the dynamics of our model are governed by a coupled pair
of PDE’s with a moving boundary constraint (and so the future evolution
of the system depends on the entire wealth distribution and not just on a
few aggregates). Such dynamical systems are well-known to be extremely
difficult to analyze – or indeed, even to simulate numerically (because the
numerical simulations can be extremely sensitive to the precise small details
of the numerical approximation).
Finally, the methodology proposed here suggests ways to think about
contemporary societies as well – although the analysis of contemporary soci-
eties will surely be more complicated because of rapidly changing technology,
growing populations and trade.
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A Mathematical Appendix
Here we present the proofs for the formal results discussed in the text. Before
we being, recall that the productivity of an individual of quality Q at time t
is:
FQ(t) = z[Q− cP (t)] + (1− z)[Q¯(t)γ − cP (t)] = zQ+ (1− z)γQ¯(t)− cP (t)
Note low quality individuals are always more productive when working col-
lectively, but whether high quality individuals are more or less productive
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when working collectively depends on whether γQ¯(t) > 1 or γQ¯(t) < 1, and
this is determined endogenously.
Proof of Theorem 1 Since the proof is a bit roundabout, it may be
useful to begin with an overview. By definition, a steady state is a pair
of density functions p0(x, t), p1(x, t) that satisfy the evolution equations and
are independent of time t. In the steady state, the populations P s0 , P
s
1 and
inheritance Y s are constant, so average quality Qs and productivities F s0 , F
s
1
are also constant. Hence we can identify a steady state as a pair of functions
p0(x), p1(x) that satisfy the steady state evolution equations
∂p0(x)
∂x
[F s0 − 1/2] = −λdp0(x) (SSEE0)
∂p1(x)
∂x
[F s1 − 1/2] = −λdp1(x) (SSEE1)
and also satisfy the appropriate boundary conditions. We therefore begin
with candidate steady state populations P s0 , P
s
1 and inheritance Y
s (satisfying
some conditions that must hold in any steady state of the system). For
any such triple, we show that the equations SSEE0, SSEE1 admit unique
solutions which yield the given steady state quantities. We then show that
the boundary conditions uniquely pin down the unique triple of steady state
quantities that correspond to an actual steady state of the society.
We begin by considering any non-degenerate solution ps0(x), p
s
1(x) to the
steady state evolution equations (not necessarily satisfying boundary condi-
tions). From these, we can derive the following steady state quantities:
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• the population of individuals with quality Q
P sQ =
∫ ∞
0
psQ(x)dx (4)
• the total population
P s = P s1 + P
s
0 =
∫ ∞
0
[ps1(x) + p
s
0(x)]dx (5)
• mean quality
Qs = P s1 /(P
s
0 + P
s
1 ) (6)
• productivity of individuals of quality Q
F sQ = zQ+ (1− z)γQs − cP s (7)
• mean wealth
Xs =
∫∞
0
x[ps1(x) + p
s
0(x)]dx∫∞
0
[ps1(x) + p
s
0(x)]dx
(8)
• inheritance
Y s = λdP
sXsη/λfP
s = (λd/λf )X
sη (9)
Because we have assumed a non-degenerate steady state we must have P s 6= 0
so P s0 6= 0 and P s1 6= 0. Note that the three quantities P s0 , P s1 , Y s determine
all the others.
We assert that in a non-degenerate steady state we must have F s0 < 1/2 <
F s1 . (Low quality individuals produce less than they consume; high quality
individuals consume less than they consume.) To show this we show that
the other possibilities are incompatible with a non-degenerate steady state.
Note first of all that the definitions and the assumption that 0 < z < 1 imply
that F s0 < F
s
1 so we must rule out the only two other possibilities:
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• 1/2 ≤ F s0 < F s1 . If this were the case then the wealth of low qual-
ity individuals would be non-decreasing during their lifetimes and the
wealth of high quality individuals would be strictly increasing during
their lifetimes, so social wealth would be strictly increasing, which is
impossible in the steady state.
• F s0 < F s1 ≤ 1/2. If this were case then the wealth of low quality
individuals would be strictly decreasing and the wealth of high quality
individuals would be non-increasing, so social wealth would be strictly
decreasing, which is impossible in the steady state.
We therefore conclude that F s0 < 1/2 < F
s
1 as asserted.
In order to show that a non-degenerate steady state of the society exists
and is unique we proceed in the following way. We have shown that, begin-
ning with a solution ps0, p
s
1 to the steady state evolution equations (SSEE0),
(SSEE1) we can derive a triple of steady state quantities P s0 , P
s
1 , Y
s having
the property that F s0 < 1/2 < F
s
1 . The first part of the proof is to show
that, for every such triple of steady state quantities there is a unique so-
lution ps0, p
s
1 to the steady state evolution equations that yields the given
steady state quantities. The second part of the proof is to show that the
boundary conditions uniquely pin down the triple of steady state quantities
that correspond to an actual steady state of the society.
To this end, fix a triple of steady state quantities P s0 , P
s
1 , Y
s for which
total population is positive P s1 + P
s
0 = P
s > 0, inheritance is non-negative
Y s ≥ 0 and for which the derived quantities F s0 , F s1 satisfy F s0 < 1/2 < F s1 .
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In any solution of the steady state evolution equations that yields these
steady state quantities, it is by true by definition that all individuals are
born with the inheritance Y s. Because F s0 < 1/2 < F
s
1 , the wealth of low
quality individuals is strictly decreasing while they are alive and the wealth
of high quality individuals is strictly increasing while they are alive. Hence,
ps0(x) = 0 for x > Y
s and ps1(x) = 0 for x < Y
s; equivalently, ps0 is supported
on [0, Y s] and ps1 is supported on [Y
s,∞). From these facts we can determine
the desired population distributions ps0 and p
s
1.
To determine ps1, set λ1 = λd/[F
s
1 − 1/2]. For x > Y s, the function ps1
solves the ODE:
dps1(x)
dx
= −λ1ps1(x) (10)
The solution to this ODE is of the form
ps1(x) = C1e
−λ1(x−Y s) (11)
where the multiplicative constant C1 is determined by initial conditions.
Given ps1 we find that P
s
1 = C1/λ1 so that
ps1(x) =
P
s
1λ1e
−λ1(x−Y s) for x > Y s
0 for x < Y s
(12)
Note that λ1 = λd/[F
s
1 − 1/2] and recall that F s1 can be expressed in terms
of P s1 , P
s
0 .
To determine ps0, set λ0 = −λd/[F s0 − 1/2]. For x < Y s the function ps0
satisfies the ODE:
dps0(x)
dx
= λ0p
s
0(x) (13)
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The solution to this ODE is of the form
ps0(x) = C0e
λ0(x−Y s) (14)
where the multiplicative constant C0 is determined by initial conditions.
Given ps0 we find that P
s
0 = (C0/λ0)(1− e−λ0Y s) so that
ps0(x) =

[
P s0λ0/(1− e−λ0Y s)
]
eλ0(x−Y
s) for x < Y s
0 for x > Y s
(15)
Note that λ0 = −λd/[F s0 − 1/2] and recall that F s0 can be expressed in terms
of P s1 , P
s
0 .
By construction, the functions ps0, p
s
1 satisfy the steady state evolution
equations. Direct calculation shows that the steady state quantities derived
from ps0, p
s
1 are precisely the quantities P
s
0 , P
s
1 , Y
s with which we began. This
completes the first part of the proof.
We now turn to the second part of the proof which is to pin down
the steady state values of P s1 , P
s
0 , Y
s that correspond to the (unique) non-
degenerate steady state of the society.
Note first that because half of newborns are of low quality and half are
of high quality, we have the following boundary condition:
lim
x↓Y s
ps1(x)|F s1 − 1/2| = lim
x↑Y s
ps0(x)|F s0 − 1/2| (16)
(As usual, limx↓Y s is the limit from the right and limx↑Y s is the limit from
the left.) Simplifying yields
P s1 =
P s0
1− e−λ0Y s (17)
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and hence that
e−λ0Y
s
= (2− P s/P s1 ) (18)
Next we compute the rate µs at which individuals die in poverty in the
steady state. (Of course, only low quality individuals die in poverty.)
µs = f s0 (0)|F s0 − 1/2|
= C0e
−λ0Y s|F s0 − 1/2|
= (C0/λ0)λde
−λ0Y s
= P s1λde
−λ0Y s
= (2P s1 − P s)λd
(19)
In the steady state the population is constant so the birth rate must equal
to death rate, which yields the second boundary condition:
(λfP
s − λdP s − µs) = 0 (20)
Substituting gives:
λfP
s − λdP s − λd(2P s1 − P s) = 0 (21)
Hence, we have
P s1 = λf/(2λd)P
s (22)
By assumption, η < 1 is the fraction of wealth that is transferred across
generations so:
λfY
s = ηλdX
s (23)
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Next we compute Xs.
Xs =
1
2− e−λ0Y s
[ ∫ Y s
0
λ0xe
λ0(x−Y s)dx+
∫ ∞
Y s
λ1xe
−λ1(x−Y s)dx
]
(24)
Integration by parts yields:∫ Y s
0
λ0xe
λ0(x−Y s)dx =
[e−λ0Y s − 1
λ0
+
λ0Y
se−λ0Y
s
λ0
+ Y s − Y se−λ0Y s
]
∫ ∞
Y s
λ1xe
−λ1(x−Y s)dx =
1 + λ1Y
s
λ1
(25)
We use the above expressions to simplify Xs:
Xs = 2
P s1
P s
Y s +
1
λd
(
P s1
Ps
[z + (1− z)γ])− 1
λd
(cP s + 1/2) (26)
We can substitute
P s1
P s
from (22) in the above and substitute Xs from (23) to
obtain
Y s =
(
λf
2λd
[z + (1− z)γ]− cP s − 1/2
)(
η
λf (1− η)
)
(27)
Using the equations (27), (22) and (18) we will determine each of the
desired quantities. We write (18) as follows.
e−λ0Y
s
= 2− P s/P s1 (28)
Substitute (22) and the expression for λ0 in the above and then take loga-
rithms to obtain:
λdY
s = ln
[
2− 2λd
λf
] [
(1− z)γ λf
2λd
− cP s − 1/2)
]
(29)
Substitute cP s + 1/2 from (27) in the above to obtain:
λdY
s = ln
[
2− 2λd
λf
](
(1− z)γ λf
2λd
+
[
λf (1− η)
η
]
Y s − λf
2λd
(z + (1− z)γ)
)
(30)
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We can simplify the above to obtain the final expression for Y s:
Y s =
ηz
2λd(1− η + β) (31)
where β = −[η λd/λf ]/ ln[2− 2λdλf ]. In a non-degenerate steady state we must
have Xs > 0. We know Xs =
λfY
s
λdη
; since λd < λf < 2λd it follows that
2(1 − λd
λf
) ∈ (0, 1) and hence that (1 − η + β) > 0 and that Xs > 0 as
required.
Now we substitute (31) in (27) to obtain the expression for P s as follows.
cP s =
λf
2λd
[
γ + z
(
β
1− η + β − γ
)]
− 1
2
(32)
Since λf >
λd
γ
the above expression is greater than zero when z = 0 and
since η > 1/(1 +
[1−λd/λf ]
ln( 1
2[1−λd/λf ]
)
) the above expression is greater than zero when
z = 1. This ensures that P s > 0. We know that
P s1 =
[
λf
2cλd
] [
λf
2λd
[
γ + z
(
β
1− η + β − γ
)]
− 1
2
]
(33)
and
P s0 =
[
1
c
− λf
2cλd
] [
λf
2λd
[
γ + z
(
β
1− η + β − γ
)]
− 1
2
]
(34)
Since P s > 0 both P s1 and P
s
0 are greater than zero. This derivation was
based on the assumption that F s0 < 1/2 < F
s
1 ; we now check that this is
indeed true for the derived values of P s0 , P
s
1 , X
s.
We treat F s1 first. Substitute (32) to obtain
F s1 − 1/2 = z + (1− z)γ
λf
2λd
− cP s − 1/2
= z(1− λf
2λd
) +
zλf (1− η)
2λd(1− η + β)
(35)
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Because z > 0 and λf < 2λd the first term in the right hand side is strictly
positive. Because (1− λf
2λd
) > 0 and (1−η+β) > 0 the second term is strictly
positive, so F s1 − 1/2 > 0.
We now turn to F s0 . Substitute (32) to obtain
F s0 − 1/2 = (1− z)γ
λf
2λd
− cP s − 1/2
= z
[
λf
2λd
] [ −β
1− η + β
] (36)
Since z > 0, β > 0 and (1− η + β) > 0, we conclude that F s0 − 1/2 < 0. To
see that F s0 > 0 we calculate:
Now we have determined the values of P s1 , P
s
0 , Y
s in (33), (34) and (31).
We can substitute these in (12) and (15) to obtain the final distribution
function. This completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 2 In the proof of Theorem 1 we arrived at an expression
for cP s in (32), so we conclude that
P s =
{
1
c
}{
λf
2λd
[
γ + z
(
β
1− η + β − γ
)]
− 1
2
}
(37)
where β = −[η λd/λf ]/ ln[2 − 2λdλf ]. It is immediate that P s is decreasing in
c and increasing in γ. P s is evidently linear in z; P s is decreasing in z if
γ > β
1−η+β and is increasing in z if γ <
β
1−η+β , as asserted.
Proof of Theorem 3 In the proof of Theorem 1, we arrived at equation (22)
which expresses the population P s1 of high quality individuals as a fraction
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of the total population P s. Since P s = P s0 + P
s
1 , simple algebra shows that
the steady state population ratio is
P s0
P s1
= 1− λf
2λd
(38)
Note that Assumption 1 guarantees that the right hand side is strictly posi-
tive and less than 1. This completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 4 We first derive the expression for mean income. We
know that P s1 /P
s = Qs =
λf
2λd
. In the simplification given below we use the
expression derived in (35) and (36).
F s = QsF s1 + [1−Qs]F s0 (39)
F s =
(1− η)z
1− η + β +
1
2
(40)
Note that mean income F s is independent of the technological parameters
c, γ and linear in the degree of individualism z. Because η < 1, mean income
is increasing in the degree of individualism z.
Proof of Theorem 5 We have seen in the proof of Theorem 1 that both in-
come levels are positive, so writing A = (1−η)
(1−η+β) and performing the requisite
algebra yields a convenient expression for the Gini coefficient is:
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Gini =
QsF s1
QsF s1 + (1−Qs)F s0
−Qs
= Qs
[
(1−Qs)F s1 − (1−Qs)F s0
F s
]
= Qs(1−Qs)
(
F s1 − F s0
F s
)
= Qs(1−Qs)
(
z
Az + 1/2
)
(41)
Because the steady state average quality Qs depends only on the steady
state population ratio P s0 /P
s
1 , which is independent of the technological pa-
rameters c, γ, we see that the Gini coefficient is also independent of the
technological parameters c, γ.
Finally, differentiating the expression for the Gini coefficient yields
∂Gini
∂z
=
λf
2λd
[
1− λf
2λd
] [
1
2(Az + 1/2)2
]
(42)
Since λf < 2λd the Gini coefficient is increasing in the level of individualism
z, as asserted.
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